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Landing on the Edge of Eternity: Twenty-four Hours at Omaha 
Beach. By Robert Kershaw. New York and London: Pegasus 
Books Ltd., 2018. ISBN 9-781681-778662. Maps. Photographs. 
Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. xl, 376. $27.95. 
 
Although a simple military history might not seem to fit within the usual 
scope of this journal’s interests, the recently passed seventy-fifth 
anniversary of the D-Day invasion of France that took place on June 6, 
1944, in itself warrants some acknowledgement as well as a minor, 
temporary expansion of the journal’s normal range of book review topics. 
Moreover, there are some interesting portions of this book that speak 
universally to the use of intelligence and propaganda, though that is not a 
major focus. Instead, Robert Kershaw, a former British Army colonel, 
historian, and battlefield guide, provides a closer look at the near debacle 
at Omaha Beach, site of one of the two main American amphibious landing 
efforts. Like the brutal assault itself, there is scant elegance in Kershaw’s 
prose, but there is power in the voices and events he captures. 
 
From a strategic aspect, Kershaw provides only a very broad sketch from 
the viewpoints of the American and German commanders and the 
problems they faced, but it is at the tactical level that the story comes alive. 
No characters are wholly fleshed out, but the quickly moving narrative 
includes excerpts from first-hand accounts that mirror the perspective of 
the average foot soldier’s limited view of a battle from over the sights of his 
weapon. The staccato nature of the story reflects the uncertainty and 
confusion of the fighting; the incomprehensible nature of the carnage that 
seems to have stunned those on both sides. 
 
To help readers make sense of it all, Kershaw provides a series of useful 
maps illustrating the troop dispositions and defensive works at Omaha 
Beach and Pointe du Hoc. One map pinpoints the location of the German, 
French, and American “Voices From Omaha” (ix), which belong to the 
most frequently quoted participants. On the American side they include 1st 
Division veterans of North Africa and Sicily as well as the untested 
National Guard troops of the 29th Division. Allied planners mistakenly 
thought that the small number of German defenders would be comprised 
of inferior troops. Instead, as a result of an intelligence blunder that failed 
to detect the arrival of German reinforcements, Americans landing on 
Omaha found themselves facing a tougher foe in the 352nd Division, with 
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its cadre of experienced veterans of the Eastern Front. Many more were 
recent young recruits to the unit, but even they were driven to put up fierce 
resistance. German soldiers who had experienced the early war triumphs 
were steeped in a militaristic ethos and had full of confidence in their 
fighting prowess.  Those who came later were aged twelve to fifteen at the 
war’s start. They grew up with the successes of the Nazi machine and were 
influenced by intense propaganda efforts during their impressionable 
years. This in turn made many of them rabidly National Socialist in 
ideology, and that commitment drove them to fight to the bitter end. That 
same propaganda effort also influenced attitudes of most German soldiers 
at Normandy when it came to their views of Allied goals and the nature of 
the German relationship with France, which many strangely considered to 
be an alliance in the effort to defeat the Soviet menace. As for America, 
German soldiers wondered why a country with such vast land areas would 
want to bother seizing France from their control. Clearly, they understood 
little about why they were fighting except what was fed to them by the 
highly effective Nazi propaganda campaigns. 
 
It is easy to overlook many of the smaller Allied intelligence failures in the 
grand strategic picture. The usual focus is on the fact that the Germans 
were deceived about the time and exact location of the landings until they 
discovered the vast armada off the French coast at dawn. At least part of 
that success can be attributed to hard-won Allied air superiority and an 
apparently lackluster Luftwaffe effort to conduct diligent surveillance. In 
the Pacific, aircraft were searching hundreds of square miles of ocean to 
locate enemy fleets, yet by 1944, Allied air superiority combined with 
frequently overcast weather conditions prevented effective German 
reconnaissance of the ports lying in some cases only a few score miles 
across the Channel. Bad weather for days leading to the invasion was the 
key to keeping the Luftwaffe on the ground, but in other respects the Allies 
were not so fortunate. Flawed, but well-intentioned decisions also played a 
role. With the rapid push inland foremost in mind, Lieutenant General 
Omar Bradley, commander of the U. S. First Army, was adamant that 
bombing efforts designed to soften up the German defenses not crater the 
beaches. As a result, American troops attempting to advance across those 
beaches in the face of murderous German fire had no place to find cover 
and safety. Many of the men confronted that concentration of fire because 
planners failed to account accurately for the tidal drift that drove landing 
craft off their targeted landing points and into the very spot where the 
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most destructive German firepower was focused. American soldiers, many 
of whom were desperately seasick and weakened from hours of bobbing in 
the still roiling Channel, were also weighted down with far too much 
equipment. Weakened, wet, sick, and traumatized men found themselves 
pinned down behind beach obstacles at the water’s edge. Bodies, 
equipment, and the detritus of battle floated around them in the water 
reddened by the blood of their comrades. So great was the carnage that by 
0830, both sides thought the attack at Omaha Beach was a total failure.  
There had been a focus on planning the logistics of moving inland and 
beating back a German counter-attack, but not enough attention had been 
paid to the immediate tactical problem of gaining a solid foothold on the 
beach. 
   
In the end, the rising tide and intrepid individual leaders combined to 
drive many stalled men across the beach, but two key decisions at a critical 
moment played a role in turning the tide of battle. First, despite a lack of 
communication with troops onshore, it was obvious to Navy observers that 
German guns were decimating the men. Naval fire support was brought to 
bear on the German defenses overlooking the beaches. The volume of flat 
trajectory shellfire loosed at those positions from point-blank range, and 
the inspiring sight of destroyers passing just a few hundred yards off the 
beach with all guns blazing had both practical and motivational effects. 
Men remembered being lifted off the ground just from the concussion of 
the battleships’ twelve-inch guns firing. That concerted naval effort 
allowed the momentum of the attack to resume and the men already on 
the beach to push forward. Seeing the impact of the ship’s firepower, the 
1st Division’s Brigadier General Willard Wyman radioed a desperate plea 
for more assault troops. Logistical timetables calling for landing more 
unneeded vehicles were scuttled in favor of rushing more fighting men to 
the beaches, and that made all the difference. 
  
Robert Kershaw’s analysis and description of the fighting on Omaha Beach 
supplemented by the participants’ own words is a fitting tribute to those 
who suffered or died there because of miscalculations and errors on both 
sides, but it’s not only the combatants who are honored. Many French 
civilians were killed as a result of the shelling and bombing raids, and 
Kershaw acknowledges their sacrifices as well. Heroic men did their duty 
that day, opening the door to Germany’s eventual destruction, but to 
paraphrase Winston Churchill after the 1942 British victory at El Alamein, 
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D-Day represented not the end, nor even the beginning of the end, but at 
least the end of the beginning of the assault on Festung Europa. Kershaw’s 
book will be of interest to anyone interested in Military History and 
national security strategy in action, but intelligence professionals will 
derive much from the lessons of effective propaganda and the depiction of 
how a failure of intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination can 
have tragic consequences. 
 
Edward J. Hagerty, American Public University System 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss2/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.2.1745
